A breathalyzer test confirmed that his blood alcohol content was, in fact, over the legal threshold."° As a result, his
Id. 4 U.S. CONST. amend. 8. This amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The article states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses unreasonably be detained." Id. 5 U.S. CONST. amend. 14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Id N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section states:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him.. .No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Id. 6 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 451, 453, 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322, 323, 326. 7 Id. at 453, 457, 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323, 326, 327. vehicle was taken under the newly implemented Forfeiture Law." On February 26, 1999, Mr. Grinberg's attorney wrote a letter demanding that the car be returned to Mr. Grinberg.'" On March 9, 1999, the petitioner, Mr. Grinberg, commenced this proceeding by an order to show cause and petition against New York City in an attempt to have the law invalidated. 3 On March 19, 1999, the Property Clerk commenced a separate action against the petitioner for a judgment declaring the vehicle forfeited as the instrumentality of Mr. Grinberg's crime of D.W.I. 4 At trial, Mr. Grinberg argued three different Federal and New York State Constitutional violations." The first claim was that the taking and retention of his car was tantamount to unreasonable seizure. 16 These theories were the plain view theory,' the theory that it was incident to the arrest,' and the theory granting an automobile exception. 26 Thus, the court found that although all of those bases [I]f the sight of an object gives the police probable cause to believe that it is the instrumentality of a crime, the object may be seized without a warrant if three conditions are met: (1) the police are lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the police have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent.
Id. See also People v. Horton, 496 U. S. 128, 136-37(1990 language that requires State action before an individual may find refuge in its protections. 4 The court determined that the seizure of the vehicle in a D.W.I. arrest was necessary because it was a mobile instrumentality of the crime committed. 35 In this case, the court held that there was a sufficient tie between the crime and the property, which created the justification for the forfeiture of the car. 36 However, in this instance, "neither federal nor state due process requires a pre-or post-seizte evidentiary hearing-for seizure and retention of D.W.I. vehicles for forfeiture during pendency of the criminal action." 37 The final constitutional claims, brought under both Federal 38 and New York State 39 Constitutions by Mr. Grinberg,° was that the seizure of his car was an excessive fine. 4 The court stipulated initially that both the Federal and State Excessive Fine Clauses required the same analysis with the New York clause providing no greater protection than the federal clause. 42 In Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that if even part of a forfeiture is ' Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1173 , 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (1978 . 3-Grinberg at 455, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (stating that "while the City's DWI policy prevents accused drunk drivers from using property before a determination in the criminal action, the City's interest in deterring drunk driving and ensuring enforceability of a subsequent forfeiture order, clearly outweighs the private interest affected"). Retention prevents the vehicle from being used for repeated illegal activity. An automobile is an integral part of DWI; it poses the threat of being used as an "instrumentality of death" should the crime be repeated... Just as there is a strong public interest in withholding a non-contraband murder weapon from a homicide defendant, there is a strong public interest in withholding a car from a DWI defendant. Id. 
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6 Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2015] , No. 2, Art. 41 http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/41 serving to punish, the forfeiture needs to be analyzed as to whether it is an excessive fine 4 Here the court conceded that although the forfeiture could be considered a fine, it was definitely not excessive when analyzed under any of three tests for measuring excessiveness: the proportionality, instrumentality, and mixed "proportionalityinstrumentality" tests.' In applying the proportionality test, 45 the court concluded that since the crime of D.W.I. has a first offense maximum sentence of one year in jail, a fine of one thousand dollars, and three years probation, or a combination of these plus the loss of driving privileges, and since subsequent offenses are considered felonies with up to four years of imprisonment, the seizure of an eleven year old car with a value of $2,000 is not disproportionate to the severity of the available sentence.'
In examining the instrumentality test, the court looks to whether "the owner's role and his use of the property were temporally and spatially coextensive with the offense charged. '" 7 As for the instrumentality test, 4 the forfeiture was not excessive because the car was determined to be the instrument of the crime of drunk driving and Mr. Grinberg is the owner of the car. 49 Since the fine was not considered excessive under eitherthe instrumentality test or the proportionality test, it was clearly not excessive under the 41 See Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610-11(1993) . "Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326. 45 Id at 458, n.16, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327, n.16 (stating that excessiveness is measured "by whether the property's value is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense"). See also U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998) (explaining that "[Tihe touchstone of constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: the amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish."). S. 602, 628 (1993) (explaining that "the question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the offense"). 49 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457-58, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (determining that "the petitioner's vehicle is the instrumentality of a charged crime, inseparable from it, and its prerequisite. Petitioner owns the car and drove it at the time of the alleged offense.").
mixed instrumentality-proportionality test. 50 The court consequently held that the D.W.I. forfeiture policy does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause. 1 In conclusion, the Federal and New York State Constitutional provisions are treated similarly with respect to the Due Process, Search and cSeizure, and Excessive Fines clauses. Under the federal or state analysis of all three clauses, the Court determined that the City vehicle forfeiture law did not violate any of these clauses. Under the New York City Vehicle Forfeiture Law, vehicles can be seized and held in DWI cases without violating a person's right to due process of the law, right to be free of illegal search and seizure, or the imposition of excessive fines. Although there may be a slight difference in the wording of some of the clauses, under these particular facts, the court analyzed both 50 See U. S. v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847-48 (1995) . The court noted:
In our view, the factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a proposed in rem forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause should include (1) the harshness of the forfeiture (e.g. the nature and value of the property and the effect of forfeiture on innocent third parties) in comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence that could be imposed on the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship between the property and the offense, including whether use of the property in the offense was (a) important to the success of the legal activity, (b) deliberate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous, and (c) temporally or spatially extensive; and (3) the role and degree of culpability of the owner of the property.
Id.
s' Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328 (holding that "the City's DWI forfeiture policy does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause, as a matter of law, either facially or as applied to petitioner's vehicle").
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8 Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2015] , No. 2, Art. 41 http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/41 federal and New York provisions in the same way, concluding that there really was no difference in the federal and New York applications of the clauses discussed.
